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The Mexican Law Committee has compiled five brief articles into one submission for
this Year in Review. The articles discuss different aspects of the Mexican legal system and
are intended to give the reader a broad view of current legal developments in Mexico. Juan
Carlos Luna and Juan Francisco Torres-Landa analyze the rapid growth of electronic com-
merce around the world and discuss the importance of regulating e-commerce in Mexico.
The article by John Rogers and Adrian Zubikarai discusses what Mexico's Business Coor-
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dinating Council (Consejo Coordinador Empresarial (CCE)) is doing to improve corporate
governance in Mexico. The areas of concern include shareholder's rights, equitable treat-
ment of all shareholders, and accountability of the board to the company. Michael Con-
nelly's article looks at the effects of the refusal by the United States to implement the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provision on free flow of commercial vehicles
between Mexico and the United States. The fourth article, by Adrian Vazquez, analyzes
three cases before the Federal Fiscal Tribunal to demonstrate how the Mexican judiciary
analyzes antidumping cases in its civil law system. Finally, James R. Holbein gives an over-
view of NAFTA chapter 19 panel decisions, the process of panel selection, and panelist
compensation.
I. Report on the Developments Leading to Possible
Regulation for E-Commerce in Mexico
A. INTRODUCTION
The transition to a digital economy is an important part of the broader move towards a
global information society. All around us, in ways and forms we cannot fully appreciate,
new digitally based economic arrangements are transforming the way people interact. This
is a phenomenon that is quite visible in developed countries (especially in the United States
where the Internet was first developed and has grown exponentially), but that is slowly but
surely picking up in developing economies, including Latin America and, for the purpose
of this article, Mexico.
Electronic commerce (e-commerce), which generally refers to commercial transactions
based upon the processing and transmission of digitized data, including text, sound, and
visual images carried out over the Internet, and the information technology industries that
make e-commerce possible, are the two facets of the digital economy forming a partnership
that has proved to be critical for changing the way business is conducted and the way
individuals interact with companies, data sources, and even governments.
E-commerce dramatically reduces the economic distance between producers and con-
sumers by reducing advertising, delivery, design, and manufacturing costs. At the same time,
it improves market intelligence and strategic planning, enhances opportunity for niche
marketing, provides equal access to markets, and provides customer involvement in product
and service innovation.
These efficiencies are more easily grasped in developed countries, not only because there
are more potential customers (with regard to total volume as well as number of computer
owners), but also because people, and to some extent the general legal system, are better
prepared to deal with the power of the Internet and the ease with which commercial trans-
actions can be performed through those means. It is perhaps the hardware and mental
shortcomings (and not so much a legal barrier) that countries like Mexico have to be really
concerned about to develop e-commerce more rapidly.
Nonetheless, some form of regulation will need to be established to create the elements
of legal certainty and safety that will serve as the basis for widespread recognition of e-
commerce transactions as binding, enforceable, and subject to dispute settlement mecha-
nisms and adjudication. Although the existing legal framework is dealing with the current
stage of e-commerce, there are some limitations (after all, the current laws were created
basically when computers did not even exist) on the exact way to interpret and recognize
electronic transactions. Since some key elements of traditional regulation are replaced in
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the field of e-commerce, the decision of how to implement new legal standards must be
carefully analyzed. The delay in creating those rules should benefit from added experience
and legal developments in other countries.
B. SOME REFERENCES ABOUT CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
In order to have an idea of the magnitude of e-commerce, as of May 1999, 171 million
people worldwide had Internet access. By 2003, it is estimated that the number of Internet
users making purchases over the Internet will jump from thirty-one million in 1998 to more
than 183 million. The amount of commerce will exceed U.S.$1 trillion by that date. By
2005, it is estimated that a billion people will be connected to the Internet.
In Latin America, the total expected sales during 1999 will be U.S.$77 million, but,
interestingly, customers from the area will spend some U.S.$90 million additionally through
sites located in the United States. At the end of 1999, it is expected that Mexico will have
approximately 1.5 million on-line ready customers (second in Latin America; Brazil has 3.9
million customers according to The Boston Consulting Group). However, the number of
users in Mexico only represents less than two percent of the total population, and effective
users to date represent only 0.05 percent of all Mexicans. Those numbers, however, should
be interpreted as a clear indication of the potential for growth of e-commerce in Mexico.
Internet sales are just the tip of the iceberg of economic value that companies can derive
from e-commerce. It is also a way to efficiently run a business, resulting in significant cost
savings. The latest research has found that worldwide businesses in industrial nations en-
joyed e-commerce driven cost savings of $17.6 billion in 1998 according to the Giga In-
formation Group Inc.
Based on e-commerce growth, three major trends will eventually transform the way
companies in Mexico (and, for that matter, in Latin America) do business: (i) electronic
integration will replace vertical integration creating a more powerful and agile organization
at a lower cost by using private networks to create extended enterprises; (ii) virtual capa-
bilities are replacing physical ones as products are being digitized and distributed electron-
ically; and (iii) micro-marketing is replacing mass marketing. Customers are going to com-
panies that can anticipate their needs and give them what they want, when and where they
want it.
Exploiting these new possibilities will necessarily accelerate an enormous amount of legal
changes; the challenge now is to make all such transformations capable of working together
under a new and creative framework, one that sponsors, rather than hinders, these types of
transactions.
C. EXPECTED GROWTH TRENDS AND CHALLENGES
It is recognized that e-commerce is still in its infancy in Mexico, and in Latin America
generally. However, there is no doubt of its potential for exponential growth. Currently,
there are approximately ten million Internet users in Latin America (representing three
percent of the total Internet users worldwide) with estimates that the figure will go up to
thirty million by 2003. Growing at a rate of approximately thirty-two percent annually, it
is expected that electronic transactions will grow from U.S.$167 million in 1998 to U.S.$8
billion by 2003. Despite such optimism, Latin American countries face several difficulties
in order to allow the complete e-commerce driven transformation.
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One of the most important characteristics of the Latin American e-commerce market is
the small Internet presence compared with that in the United States and Canada (which
has an estimated ninety million users representing more than half the total percentage of
worldwide users), and Europe (which has close to forty million users). Another important
characteristic is the rapid growth in the last two years and the potential for exponential
growth in the short term.
There are two critical success factors for the establishment of a Latin American environ-
ment for e-commerce: (i) a modern, affordable, and accessible telecommunications infra-
structure; and (ii) a sound legal environment that provides businesses and consumers con-
fidence regarding their transactions.
On the telecommunications scenario, it is clear that the growth of e-commerce depends
upon a global information infrastructure. Developing this infrastructure requires creating
effective competition in telecommunications markets and ensuring the growth of global
e-commerce through expanded access to the information infrastructure and services. Most
Latin American countries are still far away from desired telecommunications infrastructure.
As an example of the disparities within the continent, Canada and the United States have
between sixty and sixty-four telephone lines per every 100 inhabitants, compared with
twenty-one in Uruguay and eighteen in Argentina, who have the highest percentages, and
Mexico with ten lines. Another concern is the high connection charges to the Internet,
where the average monthly phone charge is U.S.$53 dollars, twice as high as the U.S.
average; consequently, only twenty percent of the computers in Latin America are con-
nected to the Internet. Opening the telecommunications market is fundamental to ensure
the growth of e-commerce in the region.
D. STEPS LEADING TO A NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK
From a legal perspective, there are several specific issues that need to be carefully con-
sidered in order to avoid the creation of obstacles in the development of e-commerce, such
as encryption, legal recognition of electronic signatures, effective protection of privacy,
taxation, contract law, transparent and effective level of consumer protection, liability,
intellectual property rights, and advertising, to name only the critical ones. As these
issues are currently under global analysis, awareness has an important role to play in
keeping all interested parties informed of important developments in providing practical
assistance, where appropriate, on how to implement and comply with such emerging legal
requirements.
Just as in the case of Mexico, other Latin American countries are discussing electronic
trade issues, seeking to boost the use of the Internet and the spread of e-commerce within
the framework of their regional requirements as well as their international integration. As
general reference, we include the following status report of what is happening in some of
the main nations in the region.
" Brazil. More than eighty percent of Latin American e-commerce transactions take place
in Brazil, which is also a leader in electronic banking. This is noteworthy because Brazil
has no e-commerce legislation, although currently the Brazilian Congress is analyzing
three preliminary drafts of e-commerce bills.
" Colombia. Colombia has already implemented e-commerce legislation, largely based on
the UNCITRAL model law. Law 527 was enacted in August 1999.
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- Argentina. Congress drafted a project Digital Signature Law in August 1999. Other
relevant adjustments to Civil Code provisions are being considered by Congress.
In summary, Latin American countries are currently in the very first stage of drafting
specific e-commerce legislation. In the short term, we will see a more proactive stance in
relation to important legislative changes in areas such as tax treatment of e-commerce,
consumer protection, and intellectual property.
In the case of Mexico, the second most important country in Latin America with regard
to Internet users, various projects to regulate e-commerce are being analyzed, including
the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce. A significant effort
to regulate electronic signatures is under way, and will most likely find its way through the
inclusion of a new chapter in the Commerce Code on electronic transactions or an inde-
pendent law dealing with these rules. Other relevant amendments to existing laws, such as
the Federal Consumer Protection Law and tax and stock market regulations are expected
to be discussed in the coming months to cover the needed areas where rules should be
considered for e-commerce to be a safe harbor when it comes to legal recognition and
enforcement.
Basic legal concerns in this process can be identified in three fundamental areas:
" Consumer Trust. Issues include electronic authentication, privacy, and protection of per-
sonal data, encryption, illegal and harmful content, cultural and linguistic content, and
consumer protection;
" Business Environment. Issues include intellectual property, electronic contracts, and cus-
toms duties and taxation; and
" Infrastructure. Relates to competition, setting standards and interoperability, education
and computer literacy, and Internet governance and domain names including trademark
issues.
E. ELEMENTS OF A NEW GLOBAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
In addition to issues that can be more narrowly analyzed on a national basis, given the
natural component of globalization of the Internet, there are some broader legal issues that
must be considered and that will require that national legal systems in some way recognize
matters that should, in an ideal scenario, be harmonized throughout all countries.
The following are some of the current legal issues in dealing with the establishment of
a framework to allow e-commerce development in all countries on a healthy and consistent
basis.
1. Safety of Electronic Transactions
The development and use of authentication and certification technologies and mecha-
nisms play an important role in building user confidence in electronic transactions. As the
importance of information systems for society and the global economy intensifies, systems
and data are increasingly exposed to a variety of threats, such as unauthorized access and
use, misappropriation, alteration, and destruction. Security of information systems involves
the protection of the availability, confidentiality, and integrity of those systems and the data
that is transmitted and stored on them. Both technological and legal solutions are required
to replace in the electronic arena the physical security of the paper-based world (the key
underlying element of traditional regulation of conventional legal acts). Cryptography will
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play a particularly important role in ensuring the security of data and the reliability of
transactions by safeguarding both confidentiality and integrity.
a. Verification of Electronic Transactions
The ability to verify certain information about merchants, consumers, and contracts in
the electronic environment is essential to establish a reliable electronic transaction. Mech-
anisms are thus needed to verify independently certain information. For example, a buyer
might want to know the commercial registration information that a business provides to
the government when the company is created, proof that the person they are dealing with
is indeed the company's representative, or whether the business is in compliance with cer-
tain applicable standards.
In the same context, a seller might want to know the buyer's identity, something about
him or her (e.g., whether the consumer is old enough to buy an age-restricted product), or
the buyer's ability to pay. Finally, both parties might need some assurance of payment and
delivery, an enforceable copy of the agreement, or knowledge of the applicable body of law
that governs the transaction.
b. Privacy Concerns
As e-commerce develops, the volume and nature of personal data (name, address, inter-
ests, purchases, etc.) disclosed on networks during electronic activities and transactions will
increase. New methods for processing the vast accumulation of data allow the creation of
customer profiles that combine demographic data, credit information, usage patterns, and
details of transactions. If consumers do not have control over the collection and use of their
personal data, e-commerce will facilitate an invasion of their privacy. But if consumers are
in a position either to decline or to give informed consent to the collection and use of their
personal data, e-commerce will not be different from traditional commerce. Businesses and
consumers will have to help adjudicate the trade-off between protecting privacy and ob-
taining the benefits of e-commerce that they both value. Education on this issue is, there-
fore, of primary importance.
c. Illegal and Harmful Content
There has been public concern about the content of some of the information distributed
and accessed on the Internet. The development of e-commerce could potentially be im-
peded by illegal and harmful content issues where users fear unwanted content, and where
network service providers fear the liability they will take on if they are expected to be
responsible for the content that flows across their systems.
2. Consumer's Interests
For e-commerce to flourish, consumer confidence is a must. Consumers must trust that
when a problem occurs with an electronic transaction, the solution will be fast, easy, inex-
pensive, and available from anywhere in the world. On the other hand, there must be
no trade barriers. These two fundamental elements will greatly define the future of
e-commerce.
Consumers using e-commerce need to be afforded a transparent and effective level of
protection. Users must gain confidence in the digital marketplace. National regulatory
frameworks that provide such confidence in the physical marketplace must be adjusted
where necessary to help ensure continued confidence in the context of the global networks.
E-commerce has many qualities that consumers find attractive, but it also has properties
that could facilitate fraudulent activities, making law enforcement and prosecution difficult
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tasks. In addition, its international nature means that the laws and regulations a consumer
relies on for protection at home may not apply in the merchant's country. E-commerce
thus requires effective protection that should be developed under international cooperation
among industry, governments, and international organizations. Digital products sold via
e-commerce, such as software, music, or services, will create particular challenges for many
existing consumer protection laws. For instance, in most cases, a consumer will consume
the product immediately by downloading it and making a perfect digital copy; this will
make returning the product for a refund problematic. Moreover, the status of click wrap
licenses, which require consumers to abide by certain conditions prior to consuming, may
violate basic consumer rights to redress. It is expected that specific technological tools will
offer new ways to resolve some of these issues and allow consumers to protect themselves
if they use them and learn to trust them.
3. Tax Implications
There is a need to ensure that taxation does not act as a barrier to the further development
of e-commerce and that this new form of doing business does not undermine the tax base.
Issues to be resolved include: taxpayer service, tax administration, tax treaties, transfer pric-
ing, and consumption tax.
Jurisdictional rules applying to taxes and tariffs are generally based on concepts of physical
geography, such as place of supply or residence of a taxpayer. As e-commerce is not bound
by physical geography, it may become difficult for taxpayers and governments to determine
jurisdiction and revenue rights. For consumption taxes, there may be a need for action to
avoid double or nontaxation.
The availability, reliability, and completeness of commercial records generated in an
e-commerce environment, including those from electronic payment systems, are also of
concern where such records must be relied upon to ensure that taxation and tariffs have
been appropriately and fairly applied.
The ability in e-commerce to create electronic substitutes, like electronic books, presents
challenges for revenue collection and quota regimes. The existence of electronic products
also raises issues of fairness between the taxes and tariffs imposed on physical goods and
electronic substitutes. The ability, within electronic distribution channels, to bypass any or
all of the traditional middlemen between producer and consumer raises serious issues for
the collection of taxes, particularly withholding taxes.
The key issues for Mexican revenue authorities (and, in general, Latin American and
others) are: to review existing taxation arrangements, including concepts of source, resi-
dency, permanent establishment, and place of supply, in light of e-commerce, and to
modify the existing arrangements or develop fair alternatives, if required; to ensure that
e-commerce technologies, including electronic payment systems, are not used to undermine
the ability of revenue authorities to properly administer tax law; to provide a clear and
equitable taxation environment for businesses engaged in both physical and e-commerce;
and to examine how these new technologies can be exploited to provide a better service to
taxpayers.
On an international consensus, any taxation of Internet sales should follow these prin-
ciples: it should neither distort nor hinder commerce. No tax system should discriminate
among types of commerce, nor should it create incentives that will change the nature or
location of transactions; and the system should be simple and transparent. It should be
capable of capturing the overwhelming majority of appropriate revenues, be easy to imple-
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ment, and minimize burdensome record keeping and costs for all parties. Failure to attain
a simple tax administration system will only result in lack of incentives for compliance and
overall evasion with little, if any, possibility of effectively tracking transactions with no
written or traceable records.
In dealing with such legal issues and others of crucial importance, such as intellectual
property rights, jurisdiction, and export compliance, and based on the fact that e-commerce
is global in nature, a global approach to solving these legal questions is required. For this
reason, Mexico and other Latin American countries must be observant of the current in-
ternational trend in defining the legal framework that will rule and define e-commerce, and
thus, in this case, the interaction of international legal frameworks plays a key role.
F. CONCLUSIONS
The role of government in Mexico, and the rest of Latin America, is first to recognize
the enormous potential of e-commerce to expand business opportunities, reduce costs,
increase efficiency, and facilitate a greater participation of small and medium businesses in
the global market. Further, taking into consideration the different stages of development
of its economies, with their diverse regulatory, social, economic, and cultural frameworks,
they have to set the policies and mechanisms to promote and facilitate the development of
e-commerce by providing a favorable environment, including a consistent and complete
legal and regulatory framework; promote mechanisms to ensure trust and confidence
among e-commerce participants; and promote the efficient functioning of e-commerce by
developing domestic frameworks that are compatible with international standards and
regulations.
There are basically two main challenges for policy makers in Mexico and the rest of Latin
America: (i) the speed of technological change and (ii) globalization. Until now, the Internet
has developed in a legal vacuum, and, at the same time, traditional policy making cannot
keep up, making necessary a more flexible approach towards self-regulation, in some in-
stances, of codes of conduct and private participation.
Efforts to regulate e-commerce, however, should not attempt to adopt a traditional ap-
proach as the resulting legislation will either become an obstacle to the orderly growth of
electronic transactions, or, more realistically, rules that are not observed and difficult or
impossible to enforce. Although to date Mexico has not yet implemented specific legislation
dealing with e-commerce and, therefore, the existing framework is dealing with a creature
it was not designed to handle, the analysis of what is to be set in place must be carefully
evaluated to avoid taking steps in the wrong direction.
Mexico and other Latin American countries are living the first days of the electronic
marketplace. As a result, Latin America needs fast, efficient, and internationally coordinated
actions in order to create a sensible regulatory framework with the aim of dismantling
existing legal uncertainties and to enable its citizens to participate in such market in a
secure way.
E-commerce in Mexico, and in Latin America generally, is a fundamental tool for eco-
nomic development. Its continued growth promises to be one of the most important and
exciting developments of the next century, but it will not be fully embraced and it will not
be able to flourish until there is trust that: (i) services and networks are secure and reliable;
(ii) transactions will be safe and private; (iii) there will be ways to prove the origin, receipt,
and integrity of information received; (iv) there are ways to identify the parties involved;
and (v) there are appropriate mechanisms and remedies available if something goes wrong,
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including but not limited to, proper dispute settlement mechanisms and adjudication. Sim-
ply put, users need to feel comfortable and secure in order to make e-commerce a part of
their daily lives.
The electronic market offers Mexico and the rest of Latin America a unique opportunity
for economic growth, to improve industry competitiveness, and to stimulate investment
and innovation. But the risk also exists of allowing disparities in the level of access to
computers and the Internet that will create a division between those in society who possess
the information and those who do not. For this reason, a partnership between government
and business is required to ensure a socially acceptable transformation towards a digital
economy, enabling everyone to fully participate in this remarkable economic and legal
transformation.
The ability to understand legal needs and new regulatory conditions will provide a great
competitive advantage that will allow response to this changing environment by rapidly
adapting not only the relevant policies but also the corresponding business strategies. For
this reason, increasing economic development of Mexico and the entire Latin American
region will be subject to the degree of development of the legal and regulatory framework,
as well as decisive private and governmental influence.
H. Corporate Governance Advances in Mexico
A. INTRODUCTION
Along with many other countries, Mexico has traditionally provided little legal protection
for minority shareholders in corporations organized under its laws. Most Mexican corpo-
rations are controlled by their respective founding families or restricted groups of investors.
While a number of Mexican companies have issued shares to the public that are listed on
the Mexican Bolsa, the New York Stock Exchange, and elsewhere, the shares held by non-
insiders represent in most cases, if not all, a controlling majority of the voting shares. From
time to time, foreign shareholders of Mexican companies have complained about what they
sometimes perceive as a lack of adequate access to or information about the companies in
which they have invested.
B. WORLD BANK/OECD RECOMMENDATIONS
For a variety of reasons, including a concern that deficiencies in minority investor pro-
tection can add to the volatility of security prices in times of financial distress, the World
Bank and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have
recently begun to promote legal reforms in various countries with a view to improving the
legal rights of investors in companies incorporated in such countries. The OECD Council,
at a meeting at the Ministerial level in May 1999, adopted the OECD Principles of Cor-
porate Governance that call for OECD member countries to promote corporate gover-
nance frameworks that will recognize shareholders' rights, ensure the equitable treatment
of all shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders, "ensure that timely and
accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the
financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the company," and ensure
the "strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management by the
board, and the board's accountability to the company and the shareholders."
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C. MEXICO'S CCE CODE OF BEST PRACTICES
Mexico, which has been a member of the OECD since 1994, has recently taken tentative
steps to address the concerns reflected by the OECD Principles. CCE earlier this year
adopted a Code of Best Practices (CCE Code) containing recommended practices for Mex-
ican companies with respect to the structure and operation of a company's Board of Di-
rectors, the evaluation and compensation of senior management, the role of the company's
auditors, the control of the company's finance and planning functions, and the disclosure
of information to shareholders. Essentially, the CCE Code recommendations seek to pro-
mote (i) an increased flow of information relative to the administrative structure and func-
tions of a company's corporate organs; (ii) the use of corporate procedures that will ensure
that the financial information provided will be sufficient; (iii) the use of procedures that
will promote participation and communication by and among Board members; and (iv) the
use of procedures that result in adequate disclosures of information to shareholders.
The CCE Code proposes that the Boards of Mexican companies assume obligations that
go beyond those specified in the General Law of Mercantile Companies, the Credit Insti-
tutions Law, and the Securities Market Law. The suggested additional obligations are (i) to
establish the strategic vision of the company; (ii) to ensure that its shareholders and the
capital markets have access to public information on the company; (iii) to establish internal
control mechanisms; (iv) to assure that the company has the procedures needed to ensure
that applicable legal requirements are satisfied by the company; and (v) to regularly evaluate
the performance of the CEO and other members of senior management.
With respect to Board structure, the CCE Code recommends, for example, that a Board
of Directors have between five and fifteen proprietary members, that the role of alternate
members be limited, that at least twenty percent of the Board consist of independent non-
shareholder Directors, and that at least forty percent of the directors be either entirely
independent or, if they have two percent or more of the shares of the company, not be
officers, senior management, advisors, customers, suppliers, debtors, or creditors of the
company. It is also recommended that the Board meet at least four times a year, that special
meetings be held at the request of at least twenty-five percent of the Board members, that
Board members be subject to strict ethical standards requiring them to disclose conflicts of
interest, and that they attend at least seventy percent of the meetings that are called.
Among the recommendations in the CCE Code with respect to disclosure of information
to shareholders are the suggestions that the published agendas for shareholders' meetings
be as specific as possible regarding the items expected to be considered, that supplemental
information relevant to the agenda items be distributed to the shareholders at least fifteen
days prior to the meeting, that shareholders be given the option of issuing proxies to vote
on certain issues through representatives, and that the information distributed include the
proposed candidates for membership on the Board and their professional backgrounds.
Additional information relative to the plans and performance of the Board and its com-
mittees and other intermediate bodies should also be disclosed.
The CCE Code is voluntary but appears to be an important step toward increasing
Mexican companies' awareness of practices that would improve the confidence of share-
holders, including minority shareholders, in their ability to obtain timely information about
the company and to play a more effective role, where their numbers of shares permit, in
the operation of the company.
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D. THE CNBV CIRCULAR
On September 27, 1999, the National Banking and Securities Commission (the Comisi6n
Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (CNBV)) promulgated its Circular 11-11 Bis 8 (the CNBV
Circular) as to certain information that must be provided to the CNBV by companies whose
shares are publicly traded in Mexico. Although the CNBV Circular will not enter into force
until January 1, 2001, it may put additional pressure on the Mexican business community
to adapt to the practices outlined in the CCE Code. The CNBV Circular does not make
compliance with the CCE Code mandatory but does require the companies subject to the
CNBV Circular to disclose periodically the extent to which they are complying with the
practices contained in the CCE Code. The CNBV Circular provides, among other things,
that not later than June 30 of each year the listed company must furnish to the CNBV a
written indication, in accordance with Exhibit 26 of the circular, of the application of the
CCE Code with respect to its board of directors and general shareholders' meetings. Exhibit
26 contains a questionnaire with a detailed list of questions regarding the matters addressed
by the CCE Code. Information supplied to the CNBV will become available to members
of the investing public.
E. CONCLUSION
Although the CCE Code is voluntary and the related reporting to the CNBV will not
begin until 2001, the fact that the code has been issued by the CCE, a body of distinguished
and influential business leaders, is a promising sign that important members of the Mexican
business community have recognized that their access to the Mexican and international
capital markets will increasingly depend on their ability to assure investors of increased
compliance with internationally recognized best corporate practices. If the experts at the
World Bank and the OECD are correct, this should help to minimize the adverse effects
of future market volatility on shares of Mexican companies.
IlL. Mexico: Implementation of "Open Borders" Is Delayed
as the United States, Raising Safety Concerns,
Continues to Deny Access to Mexican Vehicles
Citing safety, the United States continued to deny access to Mexican commercial vehicles
seeking to enter the United States in 1999, as it has done since late 1995.' Under the North
1. As noted in a recent U.S. Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General Audit Report,
thousands of Mexican trucks already enter the United States, but are limited to travel within a narrow strip
(anywhere from three to thirty miles) along the border. Mexico-Domiciled Motor Carriers, Office of Inspector
General Audit Report TR-2000-013 (Nov. 4, 1999). The report noted that all "Mexico-domiciled motor
carriers must obtain operating authority (Certificate of Registration) from the U.S. Department of Transportation
before they can operate anywhere in the United States." Id. at 5. Presently, there are approximately 84,000
Mexican commercial vehicles with such authority. Of those 84,000, "[a]bout 98% ... are currently limited to
operating within the commercial zones along the four southern border states provided they meet U.S. safety
standards. Under the applicable statutes, the remaining two percent (168 motor carriers) are allowed to operate
beyond the commercial zones." Id. at ii. These include Mexican commercial vehicles owned by Americans;
certain tour and charter bus operations; vehicles that were "grandfathered" in because of having received
appropriate authority from the Interstate Commerce Commission; and one carrier that traverses the United
States to reach Canada without loading or unloading any goods.
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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),2 commercial vehicle traffic between the United
States and Mexico was to travel freely in each country's border states3 beginning December
1995; unimpeded travel within the entire North American continent was to have com-
menced January 1, 2000. Because of what it terms its serious concerns about the safety of
Mexican vehicles seeking to enter its territory, the United States has, since late 1995, refused
to implement these two NAFTA provisions. While the borders remained closed to Mexican
trucks, the United States and Mexico have engaged in significant activity since the summer
of 1998 in an attempt to resolve the matter.
A. INTRODUCTION
NAFTA, narrowly passed in late 1993 over the objections of most labor and environmental
groups,4 sought to eliminate various trade barriers between the United States and Mexico.
Among those barriers were restrictions on the ability of one country's goods-carrying trucks
to enter into and travel freely within the other's territory.5 Under NAFTA, transborder com-
mercial traffic was to begin flowing unimpeded into and within the border states6 in December
1995. However, on the day this NAFT A provision was to take effect, then-U.S. Department
of Transportation Secretary Federico Pefia and then-U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kan-
tor, citing safety concerns, announced an indefinite delay in allowing Mexican trucks to enter
the United States beyond the commercial zone.7  While the United States
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [here-
inafter NAFTA.
3. The American border states are Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas; thefrontera mexicana con-
sists of Baja California, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, Sonora, and Tamaulipas.
4. See President Confers with Labor Leader for Fence Mending, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1993, at Al.
President Clinton met with the labor leader Lane Kirkland at the White House today in an effort to
repair a relationship frayed by the North American Free Trade Agreement ... Although still angry
with Mr. Clinton, organized labor needs his backing for its priorities: worker retraining programs,
occupational safety improvements and a bill that would bar the hiring of permanent replacements for
striking workers. For his part, Mr. Clinton needs labor's support for the health care plan if there is to
be any hope of getting it through Congress next year.
Id.; see also Environment Groups Are Split on Support for Free-Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1993, at 1. "A
dispute over the trade pact with Mexico and Canada has split the American environmental movement, exposing
a profound ideological rift over whether some large national environmental organizations have become too
friendly with the Clinton White House." Id.
5. See Mexico-Domiciled Motor Carriers, supra note 1. Some cross-border commercial activity already oc-
curs, as it has for decades, as a matter of both law and practicality. By promoting the free, unimpeded flow of
goods from one country to another, through the eventual elimination of such practices as drayage (where goods
from the interior are brought to the border by one (usually high-quality, long-haul vehicle), transferred to
another truck (often a substandard one), then delivered across the border to be delivered to another carrier),
NAFTA hoped to stimulate economic trade and integration among the United States, Mexico, and Canada.
6. See supra note 3.
7. See, e.g., Paul Blustein, White House Sidesteps Several Key NAFTA Rules, Dec. 28, 1995, AUSTIN AMERICAN-
STATESMAN.
U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor and Transportation Secretary Federico Pefia, citinghighway
safety concerns, announced an indefinite delay in a NAFTA provision that would have allowed Mexican
trucks to start traveling freely throughout Southwestern border states in a few weeks. Kantor also has
helped Florida tomato growers by tightening restrictions on Mexican tomato imports.
Id. According to at least one news source, Secretary Pefia took this action in consultation with his Mexican
counterpart, Carlos Ruiz Sacristan, "who for weeks had been pushing for a delay to protect Mexican truckers
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raised concerns about Mexican vehicles, drivers' hours of service behind the wheel, weight
limits, and insurance, Mexico noted that the commonly used American long-haul trucks of
fifty-three feet exceeded Mexican standards; thus, American trucks were likewise barred
from venturing beyond the border commercial zone into the six Mexican border states.
While NAFTA's advocates questioned Pefia's move, coming as it did within days of the
Teamsters arguing its case in Washington, D.C., questioning, inter alia, the constitutionality
of NAFTA, it appears Mexico did not take formal action for several years. Indeed, in an
apparent attempt to assuage American concerns, Mexico, through its actions, actually ap-
peared to validate some of the American concerns. For example, in July 1998, the two
nations entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding the drug and
alcohol testing of Mexican truck drivers who cross into the United States.9 The MOU kept
Mexico's present testing system in place, while creating a process by which Mexican truckers
entering the United States comply with federal drug and alcohol testing regulations. 10 The
document also envisioned creation of common databases and information sharing about
drug and alcohol testing and enforcement of regulations." While such Mexican action was
no doubt meant to allay American concerns and speed up the border opening, a plausible
argument can be made that it allowed opponents of opening the borders to point to
Mexico's unsafe (i.e., no drug testing) commercial vehicle industry.
B. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
1. Mexico Petitions for NAFTA Chapter 20 Arbitration
In September 1998, the Mexican government indicated its intention to proceed under
chapter 2012 of NAFTA, and seek creation of an arbitration panel to amicably deal with the
border trucking issue. Mexico alleged that by prohibiting Mexican trucks from free access
to the four border states, the United States continued to violate that portion of NAFTA11
At the time, the United States reiterated its commitment to enact all aspects of NAFTA,
but only after its legitimate safety concerns were addressed.
from an onslaught of U.S. competition." John Maggs, US-Mexican Trucking Disagreement Escalates as Trade Ties
Break Down, J. CoM., Dec. 22, 1995.
8. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Pena, 17 F.3d 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The case involved a Team-
ster challenge to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that the U.S. Department of Transportation
entered into with its Mexican counterpart providing for recognition of foreign commercial driver's licenses.
9. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Transportation and the Secretariat of
Communications and Transport of the United Mexican States, June 10, 1998.
10. See, e.g., Procedures for Transportation Workplace Drug Testing Programs, 49 C.F.R. pt. 40 (2000);
Controlled Substance and Alcohol Use and Testing, 49 C.F.R. pt. 382 (2000).
11. See Kevin G. Hall, Mexico, U.S. Agree on Drug Testingfor Truckers; Harmonizing Safety ProceduresJ. COM.,
July 10, 1998, at IA. The MOU came partly in response to an August 13, 1996 legal memo prepared by U.S.
Department of Transportation General Counsel Nancy E. McFadden, in which she stated that the United
States did, in fact, have jurisdiction over foreign drivers whose work brought them within the borders of the
United States. She stated:
[w]hether a Canadian or Mexican driver that operates in the United States is chemically dependent is
clearly of interest to the United States as the safety fitness of these drivers has a substantial, direct and
foreseeable effect within the United States. U.S. residents have a reasonable expectation that all drivers
of commercial motor vehicles on U.S. highways will be subject to the same high safety and fitness
standards and not be impaired by drugs or alcohol.
12. Chapter 20 of NAFTA allows a party (i.e., Canada, Mexico, or the United States) to invoke article 2006
and seek consultation with any other party, the ultimate goal of which is to resolve potential disputes.
13. See also Mexico Requests the Creation of an Arbitration Panel Regarding the Access of Mexican Trucks
into the United States, BOL-98-161 (Sept. 23, 1998), http://www.embassyofmexico.org/english/l/4/
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Interestingly, the association representing Mexican trucking interests, Canacar, expressed
ambivalence, if not downright opposition, to opening the border fearing that Mexican
drivers, in the then-current financial straits in which Mexico found itself, could not compete
effectively against their American counterparts.
4
2. Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General Reports
In late 1998, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Office of Inspector General
(OIG) issued the firsts of two audit reports that provided opponents of opening the borders
in the near future with considerable support. The audit was undertaken to assess the present
ability of the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) to ensure the safety of commercial
trucks entering the United States from Canada and Mexico. The report was highly critical
of the ability of the FHWA to adequately enforce existing federal safety standards to vehicles
entering the country from Mexico. In particular, the report concluded that too few vehicles
were being inspected along the U.S.-Mexico border, and of those vehicles that were in-
spected too few of them complied with U.S. standards.' 6 The report also noted that federal
inspectors did not coordinate their efforts well with state authorities; as a consequence,
potentially unsafe Mexican vehicles are allowed to pass into the border commercial zone
unimpeded.7
September/BOL-98-161 .htin.
Yesterday, Mexico requested the creation of an arbitration panel to analyze and resolve the two-year-
old controversy derived from the United States' refusal to allow Mexican trucks access to California,
New Mexico, Arizona and Texas, as well as for Mexicans to invest in cross-border transportation
services within U.S. territory under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). As of
December 18, 1995, the United States should have allowed the access to U.S. border states and, starting
on January 1, 1997, Mexican investors were supposed to have had access to this sector. However,
despite the numerous meetings held between officials from both countries, the United States has still
not eliminated the restrictions, which it unilaterally adopted.
The creation of the panel constitutes the third and final step of the dispute-resolution procedure
provided under chapter 20 of NAFTA. On Decenber 18, 1995, Mexico initiated this procedure by
requesting consultations under NAFTA's Article 2006. The consultations were held on January 19,
1996, and, since then, Mexican and U.S. officials have held several meetings on this issue, without
having reached a satisfactory solution. Thus, on July 24, 1998, Mexico requested a meeting of the Free
Trade Commission, based on NAFTA's Article 2007, which was held on August 18, 1998. However,
it was not possible to settle the controversy. This is why Mexico has requested the creation of an
arbitration panel which must definitely rule on this alleged infringement of the NAFTA.
In spite of its decision to continue these procedures to resolve the dispute,,Mexico is still open to
finding a negotiated solution that allows the parties to fulfill their commitments under NAFTA.
Id.
14. See Mary Sutter, Mexico Asks Arbitration to Force Open Border, J. COM., Sept. 24, 1998, at 1 A. In spite
of Canacar's ambivalence, the Mexican government expressed concern "about the precedent set by the Clinton
administration's unilateral decision to not respect the [NAFTA] border opening." Id.; see also DanielJ. McCosh,
Mexican Truckers in No Russ to Open Border, J. Com., Jan. 11, 1999, at 12A.
15. Motor Carrier Safety Program for Commercial Trucks at U.S. Borders, Office of Inspector General
Report TR- 1999-034, http://www.oig.dot.gov/audits/tr l999034.html.
16. Id.; see also Kevin G. Hall, Report Blasts DOTfor Lax Border Checks, J. CoM., Jan. 6, 1999. "... some 50
percent of Mexican trucks inspected at Texas border crossings were pulled out of service. By comparison, 25
percent of U.S. trucks nationwide and 17 percent of Canadian rigs at the northern border were idled." Id. The
Report noted that the state of California, with its four border che'ckpoints, had an acceptable level of inspection.
17. The Report noted that, whenever full commercial vehicle integration occurs, "the States will be per-
forming inspections of both U.S. and foreign carriers in the border States and the interior States." Report TR-
1999-034, supra note 15, at 1.
VOL. 34, NO. 3
MEXICAN LAW 875
a. Congressional Response
In partial response to the first OIG report, some 250 Congressmen (nearly half the
members of the U.S. Congress) wrote President Clinton, asking that he continue to keep
the southern border closed to Mexican commercial vehicles. They argued that until such
time as Mexican vehicles met U.S. safety standards, Mexican drivers should undergo the
same requirements as their American counterparts, and the federal government dedicate
sufficient resources to adequate inspection, the border should remain closed to traffic be-
yond the commercial zone. 18
In November 1999, the OIG issued a second audit report examining the FHVQA's over-
sight of Mexican vehicles operating beyond the commercial border zone. 19 This report
concluded that throughout 1998, Mexican vehicles were in fact operating in twenty non-
border states (an occurrence that was not to have happened until January 1, 2000), and that
a large number of Mexican vehicles with authority to travel only in the commercial zones
of the border states were in fact traveling beyond that zone.20
b. United States Department of Transportation Response
In response to the OIG reports and congressional concern, the DOT indicated it would
triple the number of safety inspectors along the U.S.-Mexico border and would increase
the intensity of inspections.2 Other undetermined action was pending at the end of 1999.
National politics from mid-1999 through the end of 2000 were dominated by presidential
and congressional elections; in such a climate, the proponents of maintaining the status quo
(i.e., taking no action) appeared to have the upper hand. In the United States, there was no
public clamor to remove the barriers.
In January 2000, the Administration indicated that the borders would remain closed to
18. See Clinton Order to Oppose Entry of Mexican Trucks, NAT. J. CONG. DAILY, June 25, 1999. Teamsters
President James Hoffa joined House Transportation and Infrastructure ranking memberJames Oberstar (D-
Minn.) and Rep. Jack Quinn (R-N.Y.), Thursday in calling on President Clinton to keep the U.S.-Mexico
border closed to unsafe Mexican trucks and drivers unqualified to drive on U.S. roads. In letters to Clinton
and Kenneth Mead, the Transportation Department's inspector general, the three laid out concern for the
safety of American roads based on the high number of cross-border violations by Mexican trucking companies.
If Clinton does not respond by keeping borders closed, a North American Free Trade Agreement provision
will allow Mexican trucks to begin operating throughout the United States at the beginning of next year. "The
primary problem is that U.S. drivers pass standards, including physicals and drug tests to drive on our roads,
and that Mexican drivers don't have to do any of this," Oberstar said. When asked about the expected reaction
from Clinton and the DOT, Hoffa indicated he was hopeful both would support closed borders, noting a 1998
DOT report finding that many trucks were not being inspected at U.S.-Mexico borders, and that of those
inspected, many did not meet U.S. standards.
19. Mexico-Domiciled Motor Carriers, supra note 1.
20. Id.
21. See Kevin G. Hall, U.S. Increases Inspection Force for Trucks on Mexican Border, J. CoM., July 23, 1999,
at 15.
DOT personnel will conduct more Level 1 inspections, the most rigorous inspections which include
the undercarriage of a vehicle. Currently there are three levels of inspection. In Level 1, an inspector
goes under the vehicle to check brakes, suspension and other areas. Level 2 involves a walk around the
truck to check lights, horn and other basics. Level 3 involves a check for a valid commercial driver's
license and U.S. authority to operate in border zones.
Id.
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northbound traffic for at least another year.22 In response, Mexico demanded the naming
of a dispute resolution panel 3 to review the question; a preliminary report from such a
panel was expected by mid-2000.
IV. Mexican Judicial Review in Antidumping Matters
Mexican law is based on a civil law tradition as opposed to a common law system as in
the United States. Civil law tradition demands a formalistic application of the law, as would
criminal procedure in the United States. Mexican antidumping law has tried to encompass
both legal systems. Thus, the Mexican antidumping practice is based today on common
law figures but influenced by civil law formalities. The judicial organs having authority to
review antidumping determinations have a limited trade law practice and, of course, review
the cases under a formalistic approach as they do in their everyday practice.
This section addresses controversial issues of selected cases in which the Federal Fiscal
Tribunal (FFT) has reviewed final antidumping determinations from the investigating au-
thority, the Secretary of Commerce and Industrial Development (SECOFI). We hope this
section will be of assistance for attorneys when choosing the forum in which to bring a
complaint-binational panels, WTO panels, or domestic judicial review.
The Mexican antidumping system started back in the beginning of 1987. The first legal
instrument 4 was approved by Congress in 1986, and later substituted in 1993 by the For-
eign Trade Law. After more than a one-year investigation process, few companies have the
interest of challenging an adverse determination. National producers would not want to
fight against SECOFI; importers fear customs actions; and exporters either prefer binational
panels (United States and Canada) or lose interest in the Mexican market. Thus, the number
of companies challenging adverse determinations is very limited and the FET has not ob-
tained a great deal of experience in antidumping law, as indicated below. The FFT has
chosen to apply and interpret the law under a formalistic standard.
First, it must be said that the FFT is not part of the judicial branch. It is part of the
executive branch but acts as a jurisdictional organ. It was created as a legal tribunal to review
acts from the tax authorities including customs rulings. The experience in foreign trade of
the FET comes from the application and interpretation of the customs legal framework.
The Foreign Trade Law and the Federal Fiscal Code granted, however, authority to the
FFT to review final determinations in antidumping matters, notwithstanding their inex-
perience with this new area of law.
The FFT reviews AD final determinations applying the standard of review set forth in
article 238 of the Federal Fiscal Code.25 If a final determination is considered illegal by the
22. See U.S. Delays Opening Border to Trucks from Mexico, N.Y. TMES, Jan. 8, 2000; see also U.S. Seeks Delay
in Key NAFTA Issue with Mexico, Los ANGELEs TIMES, Jan. 7, 2000. Both newspaper accounts suggested that
the Administration took this action to ensure labor support for Vice President Al Gore in his presidential
campaign.
23. See USA-98-2008-01.
24. Ley Reglamentaria del Articulo 131 de la Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos en
Materia de Comercio Exterior.
25. An administrative resolution shall be declared illegal when any of the following causes is proven:
I. Incompetence of the officer who has issued, ordered or processed the proceeding;
H. Omission of the formal requirements set forth by the laws, affecting the defenses of the
particular and the sense of the resolution, even the lack of foundation or rationale;
III. Procedural vices affecting the defenses of the particular and the sense of the resolution;
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FFT, it shall order the investigating authority either to nullify the final determination (null
and void order) or to take measures consistent with the order (nullity for certain effects).
Below are three case examples in which the FFT has issued a final order. As we will see,
due to the formalistic application of the law, the FF17 has not been consistent with standard
WTO practice.
A. CASE 1: SPECIAL STEEL FROM BRAZIL
On November 18, 1994, SECOFI determined antidumping duties for a number of special
steel products from Brazil. After three Brazilian exporters exhausted legal remedies2 6 and
filed a nullity suit before the FFT on February 12, 1998, the Superior Chamber of the FFT
declared that the AD final determination had been illegal, based on article 238(I) of the
Federal Fiscal Code.
In other words, the FFT found that the investigation had been conducted or carried out
through an officer from SECOFI,27 which had no legal existence and therefore was incom-
petent to conduct the investigation. This medium ranking officer within the investigating
authority had ordered the presentation of relevant information, ordered in situ visits, and
appeared in every procedural stage. Thus, the FFT concluded that all acts from such officer
had been illegal, and the final AD determination could not stand based on such illegalities.
Finally, on November 21, 1999, SECOFI published a notice revoking the antidumping
duties.
B. CASE 2: GLAZED CERAMIC MOSAIC FROM BRAZIL
In antidumping duty administrative reviews, the investigating authority normally exam-
ines a change of circumstances in the dumping margins. If, from the review, the investigating
authority finds new dumping margins, it would modify the dumping duties based on the
new dumping margins. In absence of an export price, it would have no other choice but to
confirm the antidumping duties based on the best information available.
On August 4, 1995, through an antidumping duty administrative review, SECOFI con-
firmed antidumping duties on the imports of glazed ceramic mosaic from Brazil because
there had been no export price to Mexico. A Brazilian association of exporters alleged that
since there had been no exports to Mexico of the subject product, the investigating authority
had to eliminate the dumping duties because there had been no dumping practices. After
filing for a nullity suit, the FFT' declared on August 25, 1998, that SECOFI was not per-
mitted to impose antidumping duties in the absence of exports to Mexico. The rationale
behind this determination was that in the absence of exports of the subject product, there
is no positive proof to determine a dumping margin. Therefore, SECOFI's confirmation
of the antidumping duties had been illegal.
IV. If the facts taken into consideration did not happen, were different or were considered in
an erroneous way, or if it was issued contrary to the applicable provisions or due provisions
were not applied;
V. When the administrative resolution issued in the exercise of discretional powers fails to
correspond to the purposes for which the Law grants said powers.
26. In order to have legal access to the nullity suit before the FET, a company must first exhaust the
revocation recourse before SECOFI.
27. Director General Adjunto Tecnico Juridico from the Unidad de Practicas Comerciales Internacionales
of SECOFI.
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On March 29, 1999, SECOFI revoked the antidumping duties and complied with the
nullity order of the FFT.
C. CASE 3: STONEWARE AND PORCELAIN WARE FROM CHINA
It has been GATT and WTO standard practice that in antidumping administrative re-
views there is no legal obligation to conduct the so-called injury test, except in the case of
sunset reviews.
On October 31, 1997, through an antidumping administrative review, SECOFI increased
the antidumping duties to the imports of stoneware and porcelain ware from China. One
importer decided to challenge the increase in the dumping duties and filed revocation
recourses and, finally, a nullity suit. On September 14, 1999, the Superior Chamber of the
FF1T ordered that SECOFI's final determination had been illegal, among other reasons,
because the investigating authority had not made a positive determination of injury to the
national production.
According to the FFI, if, in an ordinary investigation, the investigating authority needs
to examine dumping, injury, and causation, in an antidumping review, it has to act in a
similar way. Therefore, contrary to all economic logic and rationale, today's criteria would
be to examine injury and causation to the national production when the dumping margins
are modified.
D. CONCLUSION
As it can be noted, FIT's approach to antidumping judicial review is very formalistic and
confirms their serious inexperience in antidumping law matters. However, the above can
be an important advantage for respondents seeking a judicial remedy based on procedural
defects or other arguments with a small WVTO basis. Therefore, respondents must be careful
in choosing between alternative dispute settlement mechanisms (such as NAFTA's chapter
19), WTO panels, or domestic judicial review, depending on the nature of arguments and
precedents supporting the case before the judicial or panel body.
V. Significant Events in 1999 under NAFTA Chapter 19
A. INTRODUCTION
NAFTA has been a major success from the perspective of trade policy, economic ad-
justment, and political stabilization. Mexican law provides for binational panel review under
NAFTA chapter 19 of antidumping and countervailing duty determinations by each coun-
try's trade agencies involving NAFTA goods. The system is ten years old, if you include
the experience under the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and has moved from
a temporary political expedient under the FTA to a permanent fixture of trade litigation
under NAFTA. This section is an overview of what happened under the chapter 19 system
in 1999. It reviews the results of the panel reviews in which decisions were issued during
the year. It also covers problems with the process of panel selection and the status of ongoing
litigation. Finally, it summarizes a problem involving the important issue of panelist com-
pensation. All of these problems affect Mexican participation in this unique dispute settle-
ment system.
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B. PANEL DECISIONS
Six panels, two in Canada and four in the United States, issued eight decisions in 1999.
Five of the decisions involved imports of Mexican goods. It is unfortunate that no panel
decisions were issued in Mexico during 1999. The panel review of the High Fructose Corn
Syrup case in Mexico has been delayed for nearly two years due to the failure of the parties
to select a suitable panel. The section below on selection of panels deals with that issue. A
short summary of each panel review and the decisions issued follows below:
1. CDA-97-1904-02, Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Plate, Originating in or Exported
from Mexico
Two decisions were issued by the panel. The primary question was what is the appropriate
degree of deference owed by the panel under Canadian law in its review of the agency's
determination. On May 19, 1999, the panel issued a decision that extensively reviewed the
Canadian standard of review that governs panels. The panel split 3-2 on nonnational lines
and remanded to the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) to determine whether
it was required under Canadian law to issue a separate order and separate reasons for
Mexico. The CITT issued its remand determination with a separate order for Mexico, but
without a separate analysis. On December 15, 1999, the panel again issued a split decision,
with the majority affirming the agency determination on remand, applying a standard of
patent unreasonability, and the minority advocating a standard of considerable deference.
The minority would have remanded to the CITT for a separate analysis of certain factors
and an explanation of their effect on the final decision based on a standard of considerable
deference to the agency.
2. CDA-USA-98-1904-O1, Certain Prepared Baby Food Originating in or Exported
from the U.S.
This panel also confronted the question of whether the appropriate level of deference
was defined by the standard of patent unreasonability or considerable deference. In their
decision of November 17, 1999, the panel found that the findings of fact made by the CITT
were supported rationally by the evidence, applying a standard of patent unreasonability.
They also found that the Complainants failed to identify any error of law by the CITT for
the panel to review. As has been the case in every panel review in Canada under NAFTA,
the agency determination was affirmed.
3. USA-97-1904-01, Grey Portland Cement and Clinker from Mexico
This panel confronted an extraordinary number of technical issues in its fifth annual
administrative review of the antidumping order. On June 18, 1999, the panel issued a
lengthy decision that affirmed the Department of Commerce on almost all issues. The
panel remanded to the Department for a recalculation of the normal value of cement with-
out including bagged Type I cement. The panel also remanded for the Department to
reconsider its level of trade calculation and to correct certain ministerial errors. The De-
partment issued its final determination on remand on November 15, 1999, reducing the
dumping margin from 73.69 percent to 44.89 percent. The panel will review that finding
and issue another decision by February 14, 2000.
4. USA-97-1904-07, Porcelain-on-Steel Cookware from Mexico
The panel review of the ninth administrative review of the antidumping duty order re-
sulted in a decision on April 30, 1999, that affirmed the Department of Commerce in all
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respects but one. The panel remanded for the Department to reconsider whether the ratio
it used in calculating indirect selling expenses for a reseller of Mexican cookware was a
ministerial error. As a result of the remand, the Department raised the dumping margin
for one of the Mexican companies from 2.74 percent to 16.97 percent.
5. USA-97-1904-03, Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Canada
This panel issued three decisions, the first in 1998 and two in 1999. The panel originally
ordered the Department to deal with transfer pricing between affiliated companies differ-
ently than in its determination. The Department initially refused to do so, but in its second
determination on remand, it recalculated transfer pricing in accordance with the panel's
second decision. However, the Department stated that it would not be bound in other panel
reviews to use the methodology found lawful by the panel. This position is permissible
because under the terms of NAFTA article 1904.9, panel decisions are only binding on the
governments, "with respect to the particular matter between the Parties that is before the
panel." This article was inserted to ensure that the panel process would not result in re-
interpretation of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws of each country by domestic
and foreign experts, rather than judges.
6. USA-CDA-98-1904-03, Brass Sbeet and Strip from Canada
In its July 16, 1999 decision, the panel remanded to the Department of Commerce to
explain its use of average prices rather than weighted average prices in calculating the costs
of production of the Canadian producer. The Department recalculated the margin at 0.40
percent, which is de minimis. The Department also stated that the order should remain in
place because there were indications that dumping would resume if the order were removed.
This panel review took place at the same time as the sunset review of the order.
C. PANEL SELECTION AND ONGOING LITIGATION
The governments have allowed the process of panel selection to delay many panel reviews
far beyond the time periods called for in chapter 19 of NAFTA. Of five panel reviews
initiated in the United States in 1998, four have been suspended or delayed pending panel
selection. Of seven panels requested in the United States in 1999, no panels have been
selected, although two were terminated. Both the Mexican and Canadian panels initiated
in 1998 have been delayed for nearly two years pending panel selection. While there may
be good reasons for some of the delays, this trend is disturbing. If the parties can conspire
to delay the implementation of such a crucial aspect of the agreement, then they can delay
any provision. The resulting uncertainty about the application of the accord directly con-
tradicts the objectives of the agreement. It would be appropriate for the parties to comply
immediately with the terms of the agreement, rather than to continue this politicization of
the process.
D. PANELIST COMPENSATION
One of the remarkable features of the chapter 19 system is the willingness of private
sector experts to perform public service as expert panelists. There is a serious problem
developing in the process that must be addressed by the governments as soon as possible.
The rate of compensation for panelists is Cdn$400 (U.S.$275) per day, plus travel expenses.
That rate was set in 1988 in an exchange of letters between the top trade officials of the
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United States and Canada. That compensation rate was extended to NAFTA in 1993 in a
similar exchange of letters among the highest trade officials of Canada, Mexico, and the
United States. At current exchange rates, this amounts to approximately U.S.$35.00 hourly.
Most of the panelists earn substantially more than that rate in their private sector positions.
This has not caused much of a problem in the United States, where there is a large pool
of trade lawyers and international experts who are willing to serve on panels, at least once.
It has caused many of the most qualified people in Canada and Mexico to decline to serve
on panels because they simply cannot justify the financial hardship of this public service to
their law firms or other employers. The number of qualified experts in both Canada and
Mexico is much more limited than in the United States, and both governments have en-
countered problems finding experts willing or able to serve on binational panels. Once it
becomes impossible to find qualified panelists, the process is doomed to become irrelevant
and eventually eliminated.
It is time to raise the rate of pay to at least that of other similar international institutions.
For example, the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes pays
roughly four times the daily rate of NAFTA. The WTO pays panelists Sfr. 600 daily,
approximately U.S.$370 daily. Commercial arbitrators earn between three and ten times
the NAFTA rate. Based on the current rates for similar activities, the compensation rate
can certainly be raised to the WTO level ($46.00 hourly). A better incentive for ensuring
a ready supply of experts who will serve on panels would be to raise the rate to a more
commercially viable $95 hourly, plus travel expenses. This rate is lower than most of these
experts earn in their professional capacities. In addition, despite the increase in compen-
sation, there is little incentive to work extra hours given the higher hourly rate most pan-
elists can earn in their private capacities. This pay increase is therefore unlikely to create
budget problems, except in the largest and most complicated matters. It is time to com-
pensate NAFTA panelists at a rate appropriate to the expertise they bring to this system.
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